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Meier (2008) shows that the universal knowledge-belief space exists. However, besides
the universality there is an other important property might be imposed on knowledge-
belief spaces, inherited also from type spaces, the completeness. In this paper we intro-
duce the notion of complete knowledge-belief space, and demonstrate that the universal
knowledge-belief space is not complete, that is, some subjective beliefs (probability mea-
sures) on the universal knowledge-belief space are not knowledge-belief types.
Keywords: belief; knowledge; uncertainty; complete type space; complete knowledge-
belief space; universal type space; universal knowledge-belief space; games with incom-
plete information.
Subject Classification: C70; C72; D80; D82; D83.
1. Introduction
To model incomplete information situations Harsa´nyi (1967-68) suggests the use of
types instead of hierarchies of beliefs. Summing up his concept very roughly, it is the
goal to substitute the belief hierarchies by types, to collect all types in an object,
and consider the probability measures on this object as the players’ (subjective)
beliefs.
In the case of beliefs Heifetz and Samet (1998b) demonstrate the existence of
the (purely measurable) universal type space (the object into which all types are
collected) and Meier (2012) shows that the universal type space is complete (every
probability measure on that is a type).
It is possible to extend type spaces in such a way that they represent not only the
beliefs, but the knowledges of the players as well. This extension is called knowledge-
belief space.
Meier (2008) introduces the notion of knowledge-belief space, and he succeeds
in avoiding the traps of the earlier negative results (Heifetz and Samet (1998a)
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and Brandenburger and Keisler (2006) among others), and shows that the universal
knowledge-belief space exists and, naturally, is unique. This important result has
been reached by a new, strict, but reasonable definition of the knowledge operator
(for the details consult with Meier (2008)).
It is a natural step forward to examine the completeness of the universal
knowledge-belief space. For type spaces Brandenburger (2003) introduces the notion
of completeness, a type space is complete, if for any subjective belief (probability
measure) expressible in the model, there is a type which represents the given sub-
jective belief. The completeness is important because it ensures that we can take
any probability measure (subjective belief) and we need not choose of the possible
subjective beliefs, which was Harsa´nyi’s original goal too.
In this paper we consider Meier (2008)’s universal knowledge-belief space and
conclude that is not complete, that is, there are some probability measures (sub-
jective beliefs) on it which cannot be represented by knowledge-belief types.
Our result can be summarized as follows. In the universal knowledge-belief space
there is an event (measurable set) which represents kj(ki(ϕ)), that is, player j knows
that player i knows that event ϕ happens, and there is another which represents
kj(ki(¬ϕ)), that is, player j knows that player i knows that event ϕ does not
happen. However, a probability measure that evaluates these two (disjoint) events
equally cannot be in the knowledge-belief space, since b
1
2
i (kj(ki(ϕ))), that is, player
i believes with at least probability of one half that player j knows that player i
knows that event ϕ happens, and b
1
2
i (kj(ki(¬ϕ))), that is, player i believes with at
least probability of one half that player j knows that player i knows that event ϕ
does not happen, are not consistent knowledge-belief expressions. Therefore, they
cannot be in any state of the world in any knowledge-belief space.
One can see our result in two ways (at least). First, one can interpret our result as
the notion of completeness we recommend for the universal knowledge-belief space is
futile and not reasonable, since it goes against the very structure of knowledge-belief
spaces. However, the notion of completeness we apply to knowledge-belief spaces is
not ours, this a simple variant of Brandenburger (2003)’s concept. Therefore, since
Brandenburger (2003)’s concept is widely accepted in the literature, perhaps it is
not unreasonable to check whether this property holds for the universal knowledge-
belief space.
On the other hand, one can say that Meier (2008)’s model is futile and not
reasonable, since it does not meet a basic property as completeness. However, it
is clear that Meier (2008)’s model has some nice properties (e.g. that there is a
universal knowledge-belief space while e.g. there is no universal topological type
space (Pinte´r, 2010)), so perhaps it is not unreasonable to use Meier (2008)’s model
either.
We do not want to take sides on this matter just remark the fact that the
universal knowledge-belief space is not complete.
We do not introduce every notion used in the paper but refer the reader to
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Meier (2008). Practically, the paper consists of one section, in which we introduce
the basic notions and notations and give our non-completeness result in Theorem
2.
2. The universal knowledge-belief space is not complete
Throughout the paper, if not otherwise indicated, we use the terminology and nota-
tion of Meier (2008). Moreover we assume that the parameter space S is not trivial,
that is, the σ-field of S, ΣS , has cardinality more than two, and that there are at
least two players.
First we take Definition 2 from Meier (2008).
Definition 1. A knowledge–belief space (kb-space) on S for player set I is a 5-tuple
M := 〈M,Σ, (Ki)i∈I , (Ti)i∈I , θ〉, where
(1) M is a non-empty set,
(2) Σ is a σ-field on M ,
(3) Ki : Σ→ Σ is a knowledge operatora on (M,Σ), for player i ∈ I,
(4) For each i ∈ I: Ti is a Σ-measurable function from M to (∆(M,Σ),Σ∆), the
space of probability measures on (M,Σ),
(5) For each m ∈M and E ∈ Σ: m ∈ Ki(E) implies Ti(m)(E) = 1, i ∈ I,
(6) For each m ∈M and E ∈ Σ: [Ti(m)] ⊆ E implies m ∈ Ki(E), where [Ti(m)] :=
{m′ ∈M | Ti(m′) = Ti(m)}, i ∈ I,
(7) θ is a Σ-measurable function from M to (S,ΣS), the parameter space.
If we use the condition ”for each m ∈ M and E ∈ Σ: [Ti(m)] ⊆ E implies
Ti(m)(E) = 1, i ∈ I” and drop Points (3), (5) and (6) out of Definition 1 then we
get the concept of type space (Heifetz and Samet, 1998b), that is, a model where
only the beliefs of the players are represented, their knowledge are not.
Definition 2. The knowledge-belief morphism (kb-morphism) f : M →M ′ between
the kb-spaces 〈M,Σ, (Ki)i∈I , (Ti)i∈I , θ〉 and 〈M ′,Σ′, (K ′i)i∈I , (T ′i )i∈I , θ′〉
is a mapping such that
(1) f is Σ-measurable,
(2) Diagram (1) is commutative, that is, for all m ∈M : θ′ ◦ f(m) = θ(m),
M
M ′
f
? θ′ - S
θ
-
(1)
aThe properties of the knowledge operator is listed in Definition 1. in Meier (2008).
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(3) For each i ∈ N Diagram (2) is commutative, that is, for all A ∈ Σ′: Ki ◦
f−1(A) = f−1 ◦K ′i(A),
Σ′
K ′i - Σ′
Σ
f−1
? Ki - Σ
f−1
?
(2)
(4) For each i ∈ N Diagram (3) is commutative, that is, for all m ∈M : T ′i ◦f(m) =
∆f ◦ Ti(m),
M
Ti - ∆(M,Σ)
M ′
f
? T ′i - ∆(M ′,Σ′)
∆f
?
(3)
where ∆f : ∆(M,Σ)→ ∆(M ′,Σ′) is defined as for each µ ∈ ∆(M,Σ) and A ∈ Σ′:
∆f (µ)(A) = µ(f
−1(A)), i ∈ N .
f kb-morphism is a kb-isomorphism, if f is a bijection and f−1 is also a kb-
morphism.
It is easy to verify thatb the kb-spaces as objects and the kb-morphisms as
morphisms form a category (the parameter space (S,ΣS) is fixed).
Definition 3. The kb-space Ω is universal, if for any kb-space M there is a unique
kb-morphism f from M to Ω.
In the language of category theory the universal kb-space is a terminal (final)
object in the category of kb-spaces. Since every terminal object is unique up to
isomorphism, hence the universal kb-space is also unique up to kb-isomorphism.
Theorem 1. The universal kb-space exists.
Proof. See Theorem 1. in Meier (2008).
In other words, Theorem 1 shows that there is a terminal object in the category
of kb-spaces.
Definition 4. The kb-space M is complete, if for each i ∈ I, µ ∈ ∆(M,Σ−i)
there exists m ∈ M such that µ = Ti(m)|(M,Σ−i), where Σ−i := σ(θ−1(ΣS) ∪⋃
j∈I\{i}
Kj(Σ) ∪
⋃
j∈I\{i}
T−1j (Σ∆))
c.
bThe reason why we use commutative diagrams in Definition 2 is to suggest that category theory
is the right framework for analyzing kb-spaces.
cσ(·) is for the smallest σ-field that contains the given set system.
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The above notion of completeness is the natural variant of the one Branden-
burger (2003) applies to type spaces.
Intuitively, a kb-space is complete, if for any player any probability measure on
the descriptions of the other players and the nature represents a kb-type of the
given player. Therefore, if a kb-space is complete, then it is enough to take the
probability measures on it; they give correct and full descriptions of the beliefs in
the kb-types in the model.
As we have already mentioned in the introduction, the (purely measurable)
universal type space is complete (Meier, 2012) and hence it is very desirable that
the universal kb-space be also complete. Unfortunately, it does not happen.
Theorem 2. The universal kb-space 〈Ω,ΣΩ, (K∗i )i∈I , (T ∗i )i∈I , θ∗〉 is not complete.
Proof. Let E ∈ ΣS be such that E, {E 6= ∅, and ϕ ∈ Φ be the kb-expression that
[ϕ] = θ∗−1(E)d. Consider players i, j ∈ I, i 6= j.
Take the following kb-expressions: kj(ki(ϕ)) and kj(ki(¬ϕ)). Then
kj(ki(ϕ))⇒ ki(ϕ)⇒ ϕ
and
kj(ki(¬ϕ))⇒ ki(¬ϕ)⇒ ¬ϕ ,
where⇒ is for the implication. Therefore, [kj(ki(ϕ))], [kj(ki(¬ϕ))] ∈ Kj(ΣΩ)⊆ Σ−i,
and [kj(ki(ϕ))] ∩ [kj(ki(¬ϕ))] = ∅.
Furthermore, Ω is universal kb-space, therefore ki(ϕ) ⇒ ki(ki(ϕ)) (positive in-
trospection) and that ki(ϕ)⇒ ¬kj(ki(¬ϕ)) imply that for all ω ∈ Ω:
ki(ϕ) ∈ ω ⇒ ki(¬kj(ki(¬ϕ))) ∈ ω ⇒ b1i (¬kj(ki(¬ϕ))) ∈ ω
⇒ ∀p ∈ (0, 1] : ¬bpi (kj(ki(¬ϕ))) ∈ ω .
Analogously, ¬ki(ϕ) ⇒ ki(¬ki(ϕ)) (negative introspection) and that ¬ki(ϕ) ⇒
¬kj(ki(ϕ)) imply that for all ω ∈ Ω:
¬ki(ϕ) ∈ ω ⇒ ki(¬kj(ki(ϕ))) ∈ ω ⇒ b1i (¬kj(ki(ϕ))) ∈ ω
⇒ ∀p ∈ (0, 1] : ¬bpi (kj(ki(ϕ))) ∈ ω .
Then it holds for all ω ∈ Ω ([ki(ϕ)] ∪ [¬ki(ϕ)] = Ω), p ∈ (0, 1):
bpi (kj(ki(ϕ))) ∧ b1−pi (kj(ki(¬ϕ))) /∈ ω .
Therefore, if µ ∈ ∆(Ω,Σ−i) such that (p = 12 )
µ([kj(ki(ϕ))]) = µ([kj(ki(¬ϕ)))]) = 1
2
,
then @ω ∈ Ω: µ = Ti(ω)|(M,Σ−i), that is, the universal kb-space is not complete.
dSee Definition 10 in Meier (2008).
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